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Strumsky And The Source Of
California Chartered City Powers
In Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Association, the California Supreme Court effected a profound revision
of the standard for judicial review of local administrative agency
decisions which substantially affect fundamental vested rights. In
reaching its decision the supreme court posited a rationale which
identifies the legislature as the sole source of a chartered city's powers. The court's rationale, which serves as the focal point of this
comment, may prove detrimental to the autonomy of chartered
cities in the area of municipal affairs. The author relies on previous supreme court decisions and an analysis of relevant provisions
of the California Constitution to conclude that the true source of
a chartered city's powers is the constitution and not the legislature.
The author also analyzes an abortive attempt by the legislature to
countermand the Strumsky ruling, which, the author contends, would
have done little to settle the existing confusion concerning the actual
source of a charteredcity's powers.
On March 25, 1974, thirty-eight years of "veritable gospel" was reversed by the California Supreme Court in Strumsky v. San Diego
County Employees Retirement Association.' The immediate impact of
the Strumsky decision was to effectively withdraw judicial power from
local agencies and to impose an additional decision-making burden on
reviewing courts. A less obvious aspect of Strumsky is its potential for
infringement on the autonomy of chartered cities.
Prior to Strumsky, judicial review of a local agency decision was restricted to a determination of whether the findings were supported by
substantial evidence in light of the whole record.' In a 4-3 decision
the Strumsky court held that when a local agency decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, 3 the reviewing court must make
an independent judgment on the evidence. 4 Noting that the substan1. 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974).
2. Savage v. Sox, 118 Cal. App. 2d 479, 258 P.2d 80 (1953).
3. In Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 144-47, 481 P.2d 242, 252-54, 93 Cal. Rptr.
234, 244-46 (1971), the court stated that in determining whether a right is fundamental,
the "courts do not alone weigh the economic aspect of it but the effect of it in human
terms and the importance of it in the life situation." The court seemingly acknowledged
the vagueness of this definition when it held that the analysis must proceed on a caseby-case basis. Id.
4. 11 Cal. 3d at 44, 520 P.2d at 40, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
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tial evidence test is applied only when a court is reviewing the decisions
of administrative bodies which possess judicial powers,5 the court
grounded its holding on the determination that local agencies are no
longer vested with such powers6 since the legislature, which can neither
exercise nor delegate judical power, is now the only source of power
7
for local agencies, including those of chartered cities.
In response to the Strumsky decision, a proposed constitutional
amendent was introduced during the 1973-74 session of the California
Legislature. 8 This amendment, which would have allowed the
legislature to vest judicial powers in local agencies, 9 failed to survive
Senate Judiciary Committee deliberations.' 0 In light of Strumsky's
significant impact upon judicial review of local agency decisions, it
is reasonable to expect future legislative action similarly aimed at
counterbalancing the Strumsky ruling. Although such legislative
response may mitigate Strumsky's effect on the power of local agencies, the fundamental question of the source of a chartered city's
powers will remain. This comment explores the Strumsky court's
premise that the only powers of a chartered city are those delegated
to it by the legislature. The potential impact of this premise is great
since it provides a possible avenue through which the legislature may
withdraw from the ambit of municipal control matters in which the legislative acts of chartered cities have traditionally been given great deference."
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATiVE DECISIONS

Traditionally, judicial review of administrative decisions was available
on a writ of certiorari.' 2 In Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal-

ization,'3 decided in 1936, the California Supreme Court restricted the
use of the writ of certiorari to review of decisions of administrative agencies which were entitled to exercise judicial power. The court found
that two types of agencies were vested with judicial powers: those specified in the California Constitution 4 and those limited to local jurisdic5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 35, 520 P.2d at 34, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
Id. at 41, 520 P.2d at 37, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
Id. at 40-42, 520 P.2d at 37-39, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 813-15.
Senate Constitutional Amendment 52, 1973-74 Regular Session.
See text accompanying note 97 infra.

10. WEEKLY HISTORY OF THE CALwORNIA SENATE

660 (Oct. 4, 1974).

11. The matters that could be withdrawn under this rationale would be those in
which there is both a state and municipal concern. See text accompanying note 95 infra. 12. Doble
Steam Motors Corp. v. Daugherty, 195 Cal. 158,
165, 232 P. 140, 143
(1924); Osborne v. Baughman, 85 Cal. App. 224, 225, 259 P. 70, 71 (1927).
13. 6 Cal. 2d 557, 559, 59 P.2d 119 (1936).
14. E.g., Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (CAL. CNST. art. XX, §22);
State Personnel Board (CAL. CONST. art. XIV, §3).
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tion.'1 Agencies of the latter category were thought to have judicial
power because article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution allowed the legislature to establish local inferior courts, and local agencies
could be considered inferior courts for this purpose.16
The factual determinations of administrative agencies vested with judicial powers are "entitled to all the deference and respect due a judicial
decision,"'17 and due process therefore requires only a substantial evidence review of the decisions of these agencies. Since local and constitutional agencies were vested with judicial powers, review of their decisions was limited to the substantial evidence test, 18 which limits a reviewing court to a determination of whether any substantial evidence
which supported the agency's findings was presented at the administrative hearing.' 9
The Standard Oil decision did not delineate a method for reviewing
decisions of agencies that could not exercise judicial power. This uncertainty was soon resolved in Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors,20 in which the California Supreme Court extended the use of
the writ of mandamus to judicial review of the discretionary determinations of state-wide, nonconstitutional agencies. 2 In 1945, the California Legislature codified this principle in section 1094.5 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, which provides that a claimed abuse of discretion
by any administrative agency is judicially reviewable through a writ of
mandamus. Two mutually exclusive scopes of review are set forth in
section 1094.5:
In cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported
by the weight of the evidence; in all other cases abuse of discretion
is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record.
These two scopes of review are referred to as the "independent judg15. 6 Cal. 2d at 560, 59 P.2d at 120.
16. Greif v. Dullea, 66 Cal. App. 2d 986, 1008-09, 153 P.2d 581, 593-94 (1944);
Nider v. City Comm'n, 36 Cal. App. 2d 14, 28, 97 P.2d 293, 300 (1939).
17. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28,
36, 520 P.2d 29, 34, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 810 (1974).
18. Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 874, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 468 (1967); Aluisi v. Fresno County, 159 Cal. App. 2d 823, 826, 324 P.2d
920, 922 (1958). See also Kleps, CertiorarifiedMandamus Reviewed, The Courts and
CaliforniaAdministrative Decisions-1949-1958,12 STAN. L. Rv. 554, 556 (1960).
19. Savage v. Sox, 118 Cal. App. 2d 479, 258 P.2d 80 (1953).
20. 13 Cal. 2d 75, 82-84, 87 P.2d 848, 852-53 (1939).
21. Id. Prior to Drummey, the writ of mandamus had been used mainly as a device to compel nondiscretionary acts of administrative boards and agencies. Larson v.
City of Redondo Beach, 27 Cal. App. 3d 332, 336, 103 Cal. Rptr. 592, 594 (1972).
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ment test" and the "substantial evidence test," respectively.22
The question of which test to apply in a given situation was partially
answered in Bixby v. Pierno.23 In reviewing the decision of a statewide, nonconstitutional agency, which lacked judicial power, the California Supreme Court held -that section 1094.5 empowers it to determine when to exercise the independent judgment test, 24 and that this
form of review must be used when a state-wide, nonconstitutional
agency's decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right.2 5
The Bixby court refrained from reconsidering the proper scope of review for decisions of local agencies.26
The Strumsky court addressed the issue left unresolved in Bixby and
held that local agency decisions which substantially affect fundamental
vested rights must be subjected to the independent judgment test upon
judicial review.
The rationale began with the fact that a 1950
amendment 8 to the California Constitution had terminated the legislature's ability to delegate judicial power to local courts. Since the
Strumsky court reasoned that the only source of a chartered city's
powers is the legislature, it concluded that this constitutional amendment divested local agencies of judicial powers. 29 Local agencies were
thus placed on a par with state-wide, nonconstitutional agencies, which
the court had previously found to be without judicial power.80
Though the Strumsky rationale appears logical in the abstract, its application to agencies of chartered cities appears improper since it relies
on the premise that the powers of chartered cities derive only from the
legislature. In order to explore the apparent inaccuracy of this premise, a brief synopsis of the development of chartered cities is
necessary.
HISTORY OF CHARTERED CITIES

The California Constitution of 1849 delegated to the legislature the
duty to provide for the "organization of cities and incorporated villages. '31 However, it also provided that municipal corporations, but not
22. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF Tm BAR, CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE
§5.52 (1966).
23. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971).
24. Id. at 140, 481 P.2d at 249, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 241.
25. Id. at 143-44, 481 P.2d at 251-52, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 243-44.
26. Id. at 137, 481 P.2d at 246, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
27. 11 Cal. 3d 28, 44, 520 P.2d 29, 40, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 816 (1974).
28.
29.

MANDAMUS

1949, c. 153, at 3291.
11 Cal. 3d at 41, 520 P.2d at 37, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 813.

CAL. STATS.

30. Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 6 Cal. 2d 557, 559-60, 59 P.2d
119, 120 (1936).

31. CAL. CONST. art. IV, §37 (1849). Currently, the provisions respecting formation and powers of local governmental units are contained in article XI. For an in-
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other types of corporations, could be created by special acts of the legislature. 2 The use of special acts to create municipal corporations

paved the way for extensive legislative interference with municipalities. 3 Indeed, a unanimous decision of -the California Supreme Court
in 1872 declared municipal corporations to be mere subdivisions of
the state government, "which may be created, altered or abolished, at
the will of the Legislature, which may enlarge or restrict their powers,
direct the mode and manner of their exercise; and may define what
acts they may or may not perform ....
,,34 This concept was aban-

doned in 1879 when a new state constitution was adopted which
prohibited the use of special legislation respecting cities35 and directly

vested in cities and towns the power to make and enforce, within their
limits, "all such local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not

in conflict with general laws."316 It also gave cities of 100,000 or more
people the power to frame a freeholder's charter for local city govern-

ment.3" All such charters, however, were "subject to and controlled
by general laws." 38
The potential significance of the constitutional provision for self-government of chartered cities was diminished in Staude v. Board of Election Commissioners.9 There the court construed the language, "shall
be subject to and controlled by general laws," to mean that a law which

was generally applicable to all cities was also controlling as to chartered
cities, even if it dealt with subjects of strictly local governmental con-

cern. 40 To free chartered cities from this potential for legislative interference, article XI, section 6 of the constitution was amended in 1896
to provide that a charter was subject to and controlled by general laws,
except in the area of municipal affairs.4

Unfortunately, this amend-

depth consideration of article XI, see Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: I,
30 CAL. L. Rav. 1 (1941); Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: 11, 30 CAL.
L. REv. 272 (1942); Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: 111, 32 CAL. L. REv.
341 (1944); Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: IV, 34 CAL. L. REv. 644
(1946) [hereinafter cited as Peppin 1, II, I1, IV, respectively].
32. CAL. CONST. art. IV, §31 (1849).
33. Peppin I, supra note 31, at 15, 22.
34. City of San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541, 557 (1872).
35. CAL. CONSr. art. XI, §6; art. IV, §25 (1879).
36. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §11 (1879) (now CAL. CONST. art. XI, §7). This provision has received questionable treatment from the courts. The courts have disregarded
the comma between "local" and "police" and have persisted in a de-emphasis of "sanitary" and "other," leaving "police" as the only functional term. "Police" has been further construed as limited solely to enactment of penal ordinances. See Ex parte Cheney,
90 Cal. 617, 27 P. 436 (1891); In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 14 P. 405 (1887); Hill v. Eureka,
35 Cal. App. 2d 154, 94 P.2d 1025 (1939).
37. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §8 (1879).
38. CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, §6 (1879).
39. 61 Cal. 313 (1882).
40. Id. at 320-21.
41. The term "municipal affairs" was itself susceptible to various interpretations.
Several justices believed that the term was concerned solely with the municipalities' in-
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ment was not completely effective, since a charter was considered to
grant only those powers enumerated within it.42 This meant that if the
charter did not grant powers to a city in a certain area of municipal
affairs, that particular area was susceptible to legislative interference. 41
Consequently, in 1914 section 6 was again amended to provide that
a chartered city is empowered to "make and enforce all laws and reg-

ulations in respect to municipal affairs," subject only to the restrictions
and limitations provided in its charter.44 The effect of this amendment

was to change the nature of a charter from a grant of powers to a limitation of the powers which a chartered city could exercise. 45

To exer-

cise its newly found powers, a chartered city had only to provide in
its charter that the city could make and enforce all laws with respect
to municipal affairs.46 With respect to nonmunicipal affairs, a chartered
city received its powers from the legislature and was controlled by

general laws. 47 The result of the 1914 amendment was a broad constitutional grant of powers which accomplished the long-sought autonomy
48
of chartered cities in the area of municipal affairs.

STRUMSKY AND THE POWERS OF CHARTERED CITIES

In order to establish that local agencies lack judicial power, the
Strumsky court analyzed a series of California cases which dealt with
the problem of identifying the source of judicial powers in local agencies. Strumsky first considered Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of
Equalization,4 9 in which the "local court" -theory was born. In Standard

Oil the California Supreme Court held that the legislature could not
vest judicial powers in agencies of state-wide jurisdiction.

°

The

court's holding was based upon article VI, section 1 of the California
Constitution, which at that time provided:
The judicial power of the State shall be vested in the Senate, sitting
as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme Court, district court of
appeal, superior courts, such municipal courts as may be estabternal business affairs. Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 387, 58 P. 923, 925 (1899).
In a later case the court indicated that the term was broad enough to "include all powers
appropriate for a municipality to possess." Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 209, 74 P.
780, 782 (1903). For an excellent analysis of past attempts to define "municipal affairs," and a suggested standard for use in future cases, see Sato, "Municipal Affairs"
in California,60 CAL. L. REv. 1055 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sato].
42. Sato, supra note 41, at 1056.
43. City of Long Beach v. Lisenby, 175 Cal. 575, 166 P. 333 (1917); Clouse v.
City of San Diego, 159 Cal. 434, 114 P. 573 (1911).
44. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§6, 8 (1914) (now CAL. CONsr. art. XI, §5).
45. Sato, supra note 41, at 1056.
46. West Coast Advertising Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d
516, 521, 95 P.2d 138, 142 (1939).
47. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §6 (1914) (now CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5).
48. Sato, supra note 41, at 1060.
49. 6 Cal. 2d 557, 59 P.2d 119 (1936).
50. Id. at 559, 59 P.2d at 119.
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lished in any city or city and county, and such inferior courts as
the Legislature may establish in any incorporated city or town,
,township, county or city and county.
The court in Standard Oil reasoned that "[e]xcept for local purposes
[article VI, section 1] disposes of the whole judicial power of the state
and vests all of it in the courts expressly named therein, leaving none
at the disposition of the Legislature." 1 As Strumsky pointed out, the
phrase "except for local purposes" in the Standard Oil quotation was
seized upon by later cases as the basis for a different rule with respect
to local agencies. "2 The rationale of these later cases, Strumsky explained, was that
article VI, section 1, while forbidding the exercise of judicial powers by legislatively created agencies of statewide jurisdiction, permitted the Legislature to vest such powers in such "inferior courts"
as it might establish on the local level-and . .53. "local agencies"
could be considered to be such "inferior courts."
The first important case to address the question of an administrative
agency's judicial power after Standard Oil was Drummey v. State Board
of Funeral Directors.54 This case, like Standard Oil, involved the decision of a legislatively created agency of state-wide jurisdiction. Drummey approved of the result in Standard Oil, but restated its theory:
[I]f the legislature attempted to confer judicial or quasi-judicial
power on statewide administrative boards, the statutes would be
unconstitutional as in violation of section 1 of article VI of -the state
Constitution, which vests the entire judicial power of the state in
the courts, except as to local boards, and the railroad and industrial
accident commissions, which are governed by special constitutional
provisions. 5
In Dierssen v. Civil Service Commission 0 the court of appeal lent
special significance to the quoted language from Drummey. The Dierssen court, Strumsky explained, seized upon the language in Drummey
and erroneously concluded that the judicial power of local boards was
governed by "special constitutional provisions," and that these provisions must have been "the broad provisions of article XI, section 6, of
the Constitution dealing with the powers of chartered cities." 7 Dierssen then went on to examine other provisions of article XI and conclud51. Id. at 561, 59 P.2d at 120 (emphasis added).
52. 11 Cal. 3d at 37, 520 P.2d at 35, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
53. Id. at 38, 520 P.2d at 35, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
54. 13 Cal. 2d 75, 87 P.2d 848 (1939).
55. Id. at 81, 87 P.2d at 852.
56. 43 Cal. App. 2d 53, 110 P.2d 513 (1941).
57. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d at
39, 520 P.2d at 36, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
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ed therefrom that "a chartered city . . . may lawfully confer quasi judicial power on boards or commissions dealing strictly with municipal
affairs ....
"58
The final case in the Strumsky court's analysis was Savage v. Sox, 9
a court of appeal decision handed down shortly after the 1950 amendment to article VI, section 1 of the constitution, which removed the
clause dealing with local inferior courts. In Savage the court adopted
the rationale of the Dierssen decision as primary support for the existence of local judicial power,60 though it was argued that the amendment
had removed the basis for this rationale.
Though the Dierssen holding "gave birth to a rationale which has
been relied upon since the [1950] amendment [of article VI, section
1]
. ..."61 to support the theory that local agencies exercise judicial
power, Strumsky rejected it. Strumsky determined that the new constitutional support discovered by the Dierssen court was largely the result
of a grammatical misunderstanding of the "special constitutional provisions" language of Drummey.6 z This language, Strumsky reasoned, was
meant to modify the immediately antecedent term in the Drummey
quotation, which referred to railroad and industrial accident commissions and not to local boards.6 3 As the Strumsky court stated, "The
only 'special constitutional provisions' which Standard Oil had related
to local boards was article VI, section 1 itself, a section which . . was
amended in 1950 . . to remove the support which Standard Oil had
found in it."'6 4
Thus Strumsky acknowledged that the 1950 constitutional amendment made it necessary for the Savage court to find "new constitutional
justification" for the distinction in standards of judicial review of administrative agency decisions,6 5 but determined that the Savage court's reliance on Dierssenfor this justification was erroneous since Savage failed
"to appreciate the relationship between article VI and article XI, and
in doing so it totally misapprehend[ed] the comprehensive effect of the
1950 amendment on [article Vi]. Article XI does not and cannot stand
alone."6' 6 The Strumsky court considered article XI of the constitu58.
59.
60.
61.
520 P.2d
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

43 Cal. App. 2d at 60, 110 P.2d at 517.
118 Cal. App. 2d 479, 258 P.2d 80 (1953).
Id. at 487, 258 P.2d at 85.
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d at 38,
at 35, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
Id. at 39, 520 P.2d at 36, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
Id. at 40, 520 P.2d at 36, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
Id.
Id. at 40, 520 P.2d at 37, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
Id.
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tion not to be an independent grant of power but merely the conduit through which the legislature vests in local agencies whatever
67
powers it is competent to grant to them.
DOES ARTICLE XI SERVE AS A GRANT OF POWER?
Article XI was interpreted by the Strumsky court to merely vest "the
Legislature with the authority to bestow powers upon, and set up procedures for, governmental bodies below the state level."'6 8 Section 2
of article XI does require the legislature to "prescribe uniform procedure for city formation and provide for city powers," but section 2 is
followed by other sections dealing specifically with the authority for,
and certain powers of, chartered cities.6 9 Since a basic maxim of legal
construction is that the specific controls the general,70 these subsequent
provisions should control the general provisions requiring city powers
to be provided by the legislature.
Section 7 of article XI provides that "any . . . city . . . shall make
and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws." This section
is applicable to both chartered and general law cities and has been held
to be a direct constitutional grant of powers to the cities. 71 However,
reliance on section 7 as an independent source of powers for chartered
cities would be of limited usefulness bn light of judicial decisions which
have so emasculated section 7 that even prior to Strumsky it served
solely as the source of city power to enact penal ordinances.
Article XI, section 5 lists several provisions which may be included
in a city charter. For example, the charter may include a provision
authorizing the city to "make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs. 7 3 This phrase was added in 1914
and has been viewed as a grant of authority to chartered cities in the
area of municipal affairs and consequently as protection for chartered
cities against what had been pervasive legislative interference. 74 Any
doubt as to the source of this municipal affairs power was resolved in
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 41, 520 P.2d at 37, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
Id. at 40, 520 P.2d at 37, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§3, 5, 7.
In re Mascolo, 25 Cal. App. 92, 97, 142 P. 903, 904 (1914); 14 Ops. ATT'Y

GEN. 149, 154 (1949).

71. In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 88 P. 270 (1906); McCafferty v. Board of Supervisors, 3 Cal. App. 3d 190, 83 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1969); In re Junqua, 10 Cal. App. 602,
103 P. 159 (1909).
72. See, e.g., Ex parte Pierce, 12 Cal. App. 319, 107 P. 587 (1909); In re Newell,
2 Cal. App. 767, 84 P. 226 (1906); Peppin I, supra note 31, at 38. See note 36 supra.
73. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5(a).

Prior to a 1920 constitutional amendment, this

provision appeared in article XI, section 6. See text accompanying notes 41-48 supra.
74. Sato, supra note 41, at 1056-57, 1060. See text accompanying notes 33-48
supra.
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West CoastAdvertising Co. v. City & County of San Fransisco,7 5 a 1939
decision in which the California Supreme Court stated,
We therefore conclude that the Constitution and not the charter is
the source of the city's power to levy taxes; that pursuant to the
Constitutionalgrant which has been accepted by the city, it has acquired complete control over the municipal affairs, including the
power to levy license taxes for revenue purposes; that the restrictions on the exercise of that power are only the limitations and restrictions appearing in the Constitution and in the charter itself
The language of West Coast Advertising strongly suggests that the
Strumsky court erred in concluding that article XI is not a grant of
power.
In the 1964 case of Berggern v. Moore,7 the California Supreme
Court rejected the contention that a local agency was without judicial
power. To support its decision the court cited Savage v. Sox, which
had concluded that "under these provisions [now article XI, section
5(a)] a chartered city . . . may lawfully confer quasijudicial power on

boards or commissions dealing strictly with municipal affairs.178 The
Berggern court's reliance upon Savage is significant because the Savage
decision followed by three years the 1950 amendment to article VI, section 1 of the constitution, which abrogated the legislature's authority to
delegate judicial power. As Strumsky acknowledged, the Savage court
did not regard article XI as "the conduit through which the Legislature
vested in 'local agencies' whatever powers it was entitled to vest in
them,"70' but perceived in the language of section 5(a) of article XI
"a direct constitutional grant" of power.80 The Berggern court's adoption of the cited language from Savage signified that as of 1964, the
California Supreme Court continued to recognize the constitution as a
direct source of chartered city powers.
The broad interpretations of a chartered city's powers over municipal affairs contained in the Savage and Berggern decisions seem consistent with the theory that California municipal corporations have
implied powers in the area of local civil government,81 but these
75. 14 Cal. 2d 516, 95 P.2d 138 (1939).
76. Id. at 526, 95 P.2d at 144 (emphasis added).
77. 61 Cal. 2d 347, 349, 392 P.2d 522, 523-24, 38 Cal. Rptr. 722, 723-24 (1964).
78. 118 Cal. App. 2d 479, 487, 258 P.2d 80, 85 (1953), quoting Dierssen v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 2d 53, 60, 110 P.2d 513, 517 (1941).
79. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d at 41,
520 P.2d at 37, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
80. Id. at43 n.16, 520 P.2d at 39 n.16, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 815 n.16.
81. See Whitmore v. Brown, 207 Cal. 473, 279 P. 447 (1929); Salinas v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 72 Cal. App. 2d 494, 164 P.2d 905 (1946); E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORIPORATIONS

§10.12 (3d rev. ed. 1965).
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interpretations are directly contrary to the Strumsky court's construction
of the scope of a chartered city's powers under article XI, section 5
(a). 2 The Strumsky rationale identifies the legislature, rather than
the constitution, as the source of a chartered city's power, and
resurrects the potential for pervasive legislative interference-a result
which clearly contravenes the intent of the people, as expressed in a
series of constitutional amendments which were designed to protect the
autonomy of chartered cities in the area of municipal affairs. s
EXPANSION OF THE STRUMSKY RATIONALE

Comprehension of the threat posed to chartered city autonomy by
the Strumsky rationale requires familiarity with the reasoning which
underlies a judicial determination that a matter is either of municipal
concern and within the province of a chartered city, 84 or of state-wide
concern and within the province of the legislature.8 5
In Bishop v. City of San Jose,8 6 the California Supreme Court dealt
with the issue of whether the state prevailing wage statute applied to
San Jose, a chartered city. The court noted that interpretation of the
term "municipal affairs" is a judicial function81 and indicated that what
had previously been a municipal concern could at a later time become
a matter of state-wide concern. 88 However, the existence of legislative
action in an area, although a significant factor, would not be determinative of the issue.8 9 In other words, the legislature is empowered
neither to determine what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change
such an affair into a matter of state-wide concern. 0
The apparent rationale underlying the Bishop court's assumption of
the duty to interpret "municipal affairs," and thus protect each body's
jurisdiction from encroachments by the other, was that both the legislature and chartered cities are vested with independent constitutional
grants of power to act in separate and distinct areas.9 1 This interpretation of the Bishop rationale derives from analysis of the supreme
court's decision in Berggern v. Moore,9 2 in which the court implicitly
recognized a constitutional source of powers for chartered cities by
adopting the reasoning of Savage.93 Since the Berggern and Savage
82. See 11 Cal. 3d at 44, 520 P.2d at 39, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
83. See text accompanying notes 33-48 supra.
84. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5.
85. CAL. CONST. art. IV, §1.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
Id. at 62, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
Id. at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 61-62, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
61 Cal. 2d 347, 392 P.2d 522, 38 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1964).
See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
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decisions remained undisputed when Bishop was decided in 1969, it
would appear that the supreme court's holding in Bishop was similarly
grounded on the recognition of a constitutional source of powers for
chartered cities.
The Strumsky rationale, by virtue of its evisceration of the doctrine
that a chartered city's powers in municipal affairs derive from a direct
constitutional grant, may drastically alter the method by which a court
will determine whether a particular matter involves a "municipal affair." If a chartered city no longer legislates in the area of municipal
affairs pursuant to a direct constitutional grant of power, as the Strumsky rationale maintains, a court would not be constrained to balance
two constitutionally separate sources of power in determining whether
state or municipal concern predominates in any given subject area, but
could instead develop a doctrine along these lines:
The constitution grants legislative power to only one body, the legislature, but allows that body to delegate legislative power to chartered cities in the limited area of municipal affairs. Since the legislature can delegate legislative power in this area, it can also limit
or retract the power delegated. 94 Therefore, when the legislature
acts in an area in which there is some state concern, it has also
impliedly retracted from chartered cities any legislative powers
formerly granted to them in the particular subject matter.95
The result of adoption of such a doctrine would be a significant expansion of the legislature's authority and a consequent narrowing of
a chartered city's autonomy in apparent contravention to the final
clause of article XI, section 5(a) of the California Constitution:
"City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede
any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith."
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

Senate Constitutional Amendment 52, which was introduced in
response to the Strumsky decision during the 1973-74 legislative
session, failed to progress beyond Senate Judiciary Committee deliberations.96 The proposed amendment would have enabled the legis94. California State Employees' Ass'n v. Flournoy, 32 Cal. App. 3d 219, 234, 108
Cal. Rptr. 251, 262 (1973).
95. The court could possibly harmonize Strumsky and Bishop by concluding that
once the legislature has delegated to a chartered city the power to legislate in the area
of municipal affairs, that power is constitutionally vested in the chartered city. Thus,
it would still be a function of the judiciary to determine what is a municipal affair in
each instance.
96. WEEKLY HISTORY OF THE CALrFORNIA SENATE 660 (Oct. 4, 1974).
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lature to vest local agencies with judicial powers. To accomplish this
result, the constitutional amendment would have augmented article VI,
section 1 of the California Constitution to provide,
The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court,
courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts, justice courts,
and such local agencies and state agencies of limited territorialjurisdiction as the Legislaturemay establish. All courts except justice
97
courts are courts of record.
This amendment would have effectively overruled Strumsky by establishing the substantial evidence test, rather than the independent judgment test, as the standard of review for all local agency decisions.9"
Although the legislature's initial attempt to counterbalance the Strumsky
decision proved short-lived, the import of the Strumsky court's pronouncement on judicial review of local agency decisions suggests that
a similar legislative response can be expected in the future. While such
legislative action may mitigate the immediate impact of the Strumsky
decision, it will do little to remedy the apparent flaw in the Strumsky
rationale. In fact, such legislation may serve to bolster this rationale by
providing, in essence, that local agencies may exercise judicial power
if it is delegated to them by the legislature. Future legislative response
similar to Senate Constitutional Amendment 52 may thus indirectly
confirm the Strumsky court's position-that chartered cities are mere
delegatees of those powers which the legislature chooses to grant them.
CONCLUSION

From the time of the 1896 addition of the municipal affairs provisions to article XI of the California Constitution to the date of the California Supreme Court's ruling in Strumsky, it appeared settled that the
California Constitution served as the source of chartered city powers
over municipal affairs. The Strumsky court's rationale rejected this
position and ruled instead that the legislature is the source of all chartered city powers. Strumsky's impact on judicial review of local agency
decisions which substantially affect fundamental vested rights may prove
short-lived if legislative response similar in purpose to the ill-fated Senate Constitutional Amendment 52 is forthcoming. However, such constitutional amendment would leave intact the Strumsky court's rationale, whose apparent misconception of the source of powers may work
to severely constrict chartered cities' autonomy in local affairs.
John E. Fischer
97. Senate Constitutional Amendment 52, 1973-74 Regular Session (emphasis
added).
98. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.

